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II timely from the d court's judgment conviction. On 
II argues that the district court it denied his motion 
dism against him. Specifically, ues that the failed to meet 
burden at the preliminary hearing ish a foreign driving under influence 
DUI) conviction substantially the applicable 
I. § '1 
Mr. Schall was charged, information, DUI. (R, pp. ) The 
filed an Information Part /I, rging Mr. Schall with a felony enhancement for having 
previously been convicted of two prior DUls in the previous ten years. (R, pp. .) 
One of the two prior offenses was alleged to have occurred in the State of Wyoming. 
(R, p.41.) According to one of the arresting Wyoming police officers, Mr. Schall 
submitted to an "intoximeter" breath analysis, which resulted in a reading that 
Mr. Schall's blood alcohol content (hereinafter, BAC) was .066 and .068. (Affidavit of 
John H. Harris attached to the Amended Motion to Augment, p.2.) 1 
At the preliminary hearing in this case, Mr. Schall argued that the State did not 
have probable cause to bind him over on a felony because the Wyoming DUI statute did 
1 Mr. Schall previously filed a motion to augment the record with the plaintiff's exhibits 1 
and 2, which was granted by the Idaho Supreme Court. However, upon further review 
of the plaintiff's exhibit 2, it contains incomplete copies of the affidavits of Officer Kidgell 
and Officer Harris. As such, an amended motion to augment with complete copies of 
Officer Kidgell's and Officer Harris' affidavits was filed and granted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
1 
Idaho DUI 1 Tr., p. 
making this argument, IVlr. Sdlall if had a 
of \/Vyoming statute::; or an to lay;:] foundation for 
1 Tr., p. .) 1Vlr. Schall did but that 
judicial \/Vyomin(:J DUI statute. 
nle district court then if it on 
q of the mag could judicial of the VVyoming statute or if 
1Vlr. Schall had lay the appropriate foundation. (091'13/1 cl Tr., p .19-20.) The 
provided no comment. (09/13/11 Tr., p 
it was the burden 
then argued that it was the 
substantially conforms to the Idaho 
L.2·1 - p.30, .) The magistrate 
statute." 1 Tr., p. Ls. 
burden to establish the \/Vyoming 
and, therefore, State has the 
burden to get the Wyoming statute into the ma~Jistrate's record. (09/13/1'1 Tr., p.30, 
Ls. '18.) The magistrate disagreed and concluded that it could not take judicial notice 
of a foreign statute and it is the defense's burden to get the statute in the record 
according to the rules of evidence. (09/13/11 Tr., p.30, L.19 - p.31, L.2.) The 
magistrate also concluded, based on an implicit theory that the substantial conformity 
requirement is an affirmative defense, that it was Mr. Schall's burden to establish that 
the Wyoming DUI statute does not substantially conform to the Idaho DUI statute and 
that argument should occur before the district court. (09/13/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.11-16.) The 
magistrate then bound Mr. Schall over to the district court. (09/13/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.16-
17.) 
In the district court, Mr. Schall filed a motion to dismiss, wherein he alleged that 
the magistrate improperly refused to take judicial notice of the Wyoming DUI statute. 
2 
Mr. that DUI 
conform DUI a 
with a BAC cannot , but in ing a nt 
with a and O.OS can be for a DUI. (I::Z., p. The d 
court the motion d and, in doing first concluded that magistrate 
could judicial the Wyoming but that was not a requirement at the 
preliminary hearing. ,p .) It also concluded that Mr. Schall had the burden to 
prove that \Nyoming DUI statute did not substantially conform to the Idaho DUI 
statute, and that, in fact, VVyoming DUI conform Idaho's DUI statute. 
, pp. 
Mr. Sellall a conditional ilty plea to the DUI and the felony 
enhancement, preserving the ability to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on 
appeal. (R., pp. ,76- ) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of 
five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Schall on 
probation. 2 (R., pp.SO-S4.) Mr. Schall timely appealed. (R., pp.SS-90.) 
2 Both the information and the judgment of conviction state that Mr. Schall's felony 
enhancement was pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5) when they should have referenced 
I.C. § 18-8005(6). (R., pp.40-41, 80.) However, facts in the Information allege that 
Mr. Schall was previously convicted of two DUls. 
3 
district court err it 
that \/Vyoming's DUI 
substantially conforms Idaho's DUI 
preliminary hearing? 
4 
lrrtrod U~~J1QIl 
1\;1r. Schall anjues that insufficient was the pn::liminary 
bind him over to the district court on a felony DUI. DUI is a misdemeanor 
in Idaho. I.C. § '18-8005. How(::ver, if a person has two prior DUls and, within 
a ird DUI convictioll, I.e § 1 allows the 
third DUI as a That same the use a DUI 
from a foreign jurisdiction for felony enhancement purposes if the statute 
under which that foreign conviction was predicated substantially conforms to 
I.C. § '18-8004(1). Both the magistrate and the district court treated the substantial 
conformity requirement as an affirmative defense, as opposed to an element of the 
charging enhancement, shifting the burden of proof from the State to Mr, Schall. 
Mr. Schall argues that at the preliminary hearing it is the State's burden to prove 
that probable cause exists for every element of a charging enhancement, and that the 
substantial conformance requirement is an element of the charging enhancement. It 
follows that it is the State's burden to get the foreign statute into the magistrate's record 
in order to establish that the foreign conviction substantially conforms to the applicable 
portions of I.C. § 18-8004. Since the Wyoming statute was not in the magistrate's 
record, and since there was no evidence indicating that the Wyoming DUI statute 
substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8004, the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Schall's motion to dismiss. 
5 
If this Court finds that was a sufficient the preliminary hearing to 
IVlr. Schall over to court on the Information Part II, ~vlr. Schall , In 
altemative, that the Ing DUI statute not substantially conform to the 
licable I.C. § ~1 and thus. his rnotion dism should 
n on that basis. 
F3 
"Issues of statutory int(c3rpretation present questions of law over which this Court 
" v 1 Idaho 1, ('1 
"At a preliminary hearing, the state must prove only that a crime was committed 
and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed it." 
State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82,84 (1989) (citing I.C.R. 1(b)), 'The finding of probable 
cause must be based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the 
offense charged." State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing I.C.R. 
5.1(b)). In the context of I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
noted that "charging enhancements" which elevate a misdemeanor offense to a felony 
offense constitute an element of the enhanced crime. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 
891 n.2 (Ct. App. 2010). The applicable charging enhancement in this case is 
I.C. § 18-8005(6), which follows: 
Except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, any person who 
pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 
18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found 
guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or more violations of the provisions of 
section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any substantially 
6 
conforming foreign criminal violation, or 
ten Cl rs, notwithstanding 
judgment(s), shall guilty of a felony. 
In order for a DUI a felony under I.C. § '1 
burden of provin~;J prior under I.C. 1 
within 
or withheld 
, the 
lise a ign conviction as one of the prior the adds an 
which requ that foreign conviction substantially conform 
I.C.l 1) . 
There is authority, in addition opinion, which supports the 
proposition that the ubstantial conformance requirement contained in 1.1 
is an element the':! and not an affirmative In v. .J 16 
Idaho (Ct. 1989), the criminalizing the failing for an 
emergency vehicle was at on appeal. 3 There relevant were 
I. 49-645 and 49-606. Idaho Code Section 49-645 stated that "[u]pon the 
immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of an audible or 
visible signal, meeting the requirements of section 49-606, Idaho Code, the driver of 
every other vehicle shall yield the right of way .... " Id. at 973-974. Idaho Code 
Section 49-606 contained specific standards, such as decibel levels, for the audio and 
visual signals. Id. The narrow issue on appeal was whether the requirements of former 
I.C. § 49-606 constituted elements of I.C. § 49-645, which had to have been proven by 
the State. The Court of Appeals employed the following rationale in ruling on this issue: 
It is said generally that "the elements of a crime are its requisite (a) 
conduct (act or omission to act) and (b) mental fault (except for strict 
3 Failing to yield to an emergency vehicle was originally enacted as a criminal statute, 
but the Idaho Legislature has since reduced it to an infraction. Monaghan, 116 Idaho at 
974. However, the Monaghan Court interpreted the relevant statutes, I.C. §§ 49-645 
(repealed and replaced by I.C. § 49-625) and 49-606 (repealed and replaced by 
I.e. § 49-623), in accordance with their meaning when originally enacted. Id. 
7 
lei. at 
liability 
SCOTT, 
are 
conditions are what 
circumstances." 
attendant 
Section clearly that drivers of all vehicles must yield 
right of way to authorized "making use of an audible or visible 
signal, meeting the requirements section Idaho " 
Those conditions are out Iy. Among other things, the vehicle 
making use of an audible warning signal having a decibel rating 
at a distance of ten or must displaying a flashing light or 
visible from direction a c! 1 under normal 
atmospheric conditions. can only conclude from the the 
that the lature intended conditions 
could found guilty of failure to yield an 
The statutory conditions are elements of the offense. The 
burden to prove that at least one of the emergency warning 
compliance with the statutes. 
vehicle. 
had the 
was In 
(footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals held that the standards 
governing the audio and visual signals contained in former I.C. § 49-606, constituted 
"special attendant circumstances," which are an element of the offense. As such, it is 
the State's burden to establish that the audio or visual signals meet the standards set 
forth in former I.C. § 49-606. 
In this case, the requirement that a foreign conviction being used to establish a 
charging enhancement is a special attendant circumstance, which constitutes an 
element of the offense. Similar to I.C. §§ 49-645 and 49-606, the Idaho Legislature 
stated in I.C. § 18-8005(6), that when a foreign conviction is used as a predicate 
conviction for a felony DUI charging enhancement, the conviction must substantially 
conform to a conviction obtained pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(1). There is little difference 
between the requirement that a police siren have a minimum decibel range and the 
requirement that a foreign conviction substantially conform to I.C. § 18-8004(1). Due to 
8 
similarities, the substantially ing requirement is a condition which 
m a foreign conviction can a charging 
such, the district court erred when it that the 
bear the burden of establishing that a statute in a foreign jurisdiction substantially 
to I.C. § 18-8004(1). , pp. . ) 
Further support for lVlr. position can found in v. 
Idaho (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court dealt with question of whether an 
contained in a criminal statute functioned as an offense which 
the had burden or if the was an affirmative defense which 
the defendant had the burden prove. The lang of that statute 
as otherwise provided in this act, every person who any 
narcotic excegLJdI2oll .. th~L written prescription of aJ2b.Y§icialJ.L~~IE?nti§1 
Qodiatrist~steoQath or veterinarian license(;L1~QIactice in this state, may 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not to 
ten (10) years. 
I.C. § 37-32024 (emphasis added). In resolving this issue, the Idaho Supreme Court 
noted the general rule, which follows: 
In the absence of a statute, the general rule is that the burden is 
upon the state in a criminal case to negative any exception or proviso 
appearing in that part of the statute which defines the crime if the 
exception is 'so incorporated with the language describing and defining 
the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and 
clearly described if the exception is omitted * * *.' 
Segovia, 93 Idaho at 210 (Quoting 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, § 98, 
pp.940-941). The Supreme Court went on to note that the State must aver the 
exception in the Information. Id. The Segovia Court ultimately held that the exception, 
or lack of a prescription, was an "integral" part of the statute because it defined that 
4 Idaho Code Section 37-3202 has been subsequently revised and bears no 
relationships to the version which existed in 1969. 
9 
crime it is not a u;::,:')t;:;:,::> a narcotic dn.lfJ pursuant a 
liability can an 
it is an integral crime. 
did not that the conviction 
substantially 1), then any foreign conviction, including ones 
unrelated DUI could used to establish a felony DUI charging 
at a preliminary hearing, without the rase substantially 
conforming I.C. § 1 1 ), is nothing left in the statute modifying what type 
can ish rging enhancement 
a foreign conviction, such as assault, theft, or criminal could as a prior 
foreign for a felony DUI enhancement. Therefore, the substantially conforming 
foreign conviction requirement is an integral portion of I.C. § 1 it 
actually defines scope of the type of foreign convictions which can be used by the 
State for the charging enhancement of felony DUI. 
Turning to the rationale employed by the district court's concerning this issue, 
the district court relied on State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36 (1992), and its progeny 
(R., pp.63-63), for the proposition that it is not the State's burden to establish that a prior 
foreign conviction substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8005(6). (R., pp.63-64.) The 
district court's reliance on this case was misplaced because Beloit deals with the 
question of whether a prior conviction can be collaterally attacked, not whether the 
substantially conforming requirement is an element of I.C. § 18-8005(6). In that case, 
Mr. Beloit was charged with a felony DUI based on three prior DUI convictions. Id. at 
36. Mr. Beloit entered into a conditional guilty plea and argued on appeal that: 
two of the three prior DUI convictions used by the State in enhancing his 
charge from a misdemeanor to a felony were not valid convictions for 
10 
of the felony enhancement provisions Beloit was not 
provided all of his constitutional rights under the United or IdarlO 
Constitution at the of UlOse convictions. 
not at hand the question of whether a 
is valid is entirely distinct and from the question of whether a prior 
foreign conviction substantially conforms I. C. § 18-8004. For example, in 
supra, the appellant, Mr. Moore, made various appellate challenges the State's use of 
a foreign conviction for charging enhancement ,., Idaho at 89'1 
of challenges was whether the conviction was constitutionally valid 
one of challenges was the n conviction substantially 
conforrned to I.C. 1)(a), (b) or Id. at The Court of 
dealt with these in separate sections of the Moore opinion and employed an 
entirely different analysis for each issue, as they are distinct and separate issues. Id. In 
fact, the Court of Appeals discussed the Beloit opinion in the section of the Moore 
opinion dealing with the question of whether the foreign conviction was constitutionally 
valid. Id. at 894-895. As such, the district court erred when it relied on the Beloit 
opinion to conclude that the State did not have the burden to establish that Wyoming's 
DUI statute substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8004(1). 
In sum, charging enhancements constitute an element of the offense. In this 
case, the requirement that the foreign Wyoming DUI statute substantially conforms to 
I.C. § 18-8004(1) is an element of I.C. § 18-18-8005(6) because it is a special condition 
which must exist before the foreign conviction can be used to enhance a misdemeanor 
DUI to a felony DUI. In fact, the substantially conforming requirement literally defines 
the scope of the charging enhancement and, without that language, any foreign 
11 
unrelated to DUI could enhance a misdemeanor DUI to a 
It cI court it that Mr. Schall 
ing conviction did conform 
I.C. § 1 is an element charging enhancement which 
the burden to establish at the preliminary hearing. 
D. 
/\t the preliminary hearing, Mr. Schall it request tflat the 
district take judicial of ing Statute , (b )(ii), and 
(c)(ii). 1 Tr., p. '18.) The magistrate judicial the 
statute on the belief that the defense had to lay the proper foundation 
statute it was "the burden of the the statute." 1 
Tr., p.29, LA ~ p.31, .) After the case was bound over to the district court, that court 
noted that the magistrate could take judicial notice of the':) \jVyoming statute without any 
foundation, but went on to hold that there was no requirement for the Wyoming statute 
to be included in the magistrate's record. (R., p.64.) 
The district court correctly recognized that Idaho courts can take judicial notice of 
foreign statutes. White v. White, 94 Idaho 26, 30 (1971). However, the district court 
failed to recognize this it is the burden of the proponent of the foreign statute to request 
the trial court to take judicial notice of the statute. The Idaho Supreme Court noted as 
such in the White opinion, which follows: 
In the case at bar, appellant made no request that the trial court 
take judicial notice of the law of Pennsylvania as to majority age. Having 
failed to request judicial notice of that law, she cannot now complain that 
the court did not exercise this power. A request for judicial notice of the 
law of a sister state serves the function of alerting the trial court to the 
contention that the law of another state is applicable, gives opposing 
12 
and the 
In the appellant submitting the Pennsylvania the 
trial court was fully justified in applying Idaho law, 
leI. the proponent of the foreign that the district 
judicial notice of the it was too late an appellate court to tak(,; judicial of 
the tute on appeal, 
Luning that this Court with the arguments forth In Section I 
that it was the burden to f3stablish Wyoming substantially 
conforms to I.C, 18 \ ) , State never met its burden it failed 
that district judicial notice VVyoming statute the 
prelinlinary hearing, Mr, Schall actually attempted to the \/Vyoming in the 
and the mag operating under a misapprehension of law, provided 
State with an opportunity to at least argue that the magistrate could take judicial notice 
of the Wyoming statute. (09/13/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.4-20.) However, the State did not 
advocate for the magistrate to take judicial notice of the Wyoming statute. (09/13/11 
Tr., p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) Since the magistrate never took judicial notice of the 
Wyoming statute, there is nothing in the record it could use to establish that the 
Wyoming statute substantially conforms to I.C. § 18-8004(1). As such, the State did not 
meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing. 
According to the logic of the White opinion, it would be too late for this Court to 
take judicial notice of the Wyoming statute on appeal. It follows that the magistrate did 
not have a sufficient record to bind Mr. Schall over to the district court because the 
State had nothing in the magistrate's record it could rely in to establish that Mr. Schall's 
13 
ing 
court 
In the 
I(C) and I(D), 
Ily I. 1 ). 
I/'s motion to 
that this Court d 
Mr. II 
with the arguments 
in the alternative, that 
probable cause to bind him over to the district court 
I.C. §1 
'1 . Mr. 
conform to 
that S. § 
district 
forth in 
magistrate did not 
the applicable 
at 
not substantially 
conform the relevant portions of I. C. § 1 1) I. C. '1 
the from prosecuting a DUI if the defendant has a under (J08 
percent, while in Wyoming tile a defendant's BAC is 0.06 and 0.08 
preclude the State from prosecuting a defendant for a DUI In other words, VV.S. 
§ 31-5-233 potentially criminalizes a class of defendants that cannot be prosecuted in 
Idaho as a matter of law and, therefore, W.S. § 31-5-233 does not substantially conform 
to the applicable portions of I.C. § 18-8004(1). 
When engaging in the substantial conformance analysis required under 
I.C. § 18-8005(6), I.C. § 18-8005(8) requires that "the comparison should be on the 
elements of the statutes, and not the specific conduct giving rise to the prior violations." 
State v. Schmolf, 144 Idaho 800, 803 (Ct. App. 2007). "The elements of the violation in 
each state must substantially conform to each other." Id. However, "[s]ubstantial 
conformity does not require exact correspondence between the two statutes." Id. at 
804. 
14 
1 
(c)(ii). In comparing the 
elements of the Idaho statute and the VVyoming se statute, they are not 
substantially similar because Idaho defines a person as with a BAC below 0.08 as a 
matter of law as not being under the influence of alcohol, while \Nyoming allows for the 
prosecution of defendants with a BAC below 0.08. 
In this case, the district court relied on Schmoll for its determination that 
W.S. § 31-5-233 substantially conforms to the applicable portions of I.C. § 18-8004. 
(R., pp.65-68.) In Schmoll the Idaho Court of Appeals considered an issue of first 
impression in Idaho, namely "which factors to compare and the standard with which to 
compare them" in determining whether an out-of-state conviction was a "substantially 
conforming foreign criminal violation" under what was then Idaho Code § 18-8005(8).5 
Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 803. At issue in Schmoll was Montana's felony DUI statute, 
which was being used as the basis to elevate a DUI to a felony in Idaho. Under the 
5 The provision has since been renumbered to § 18-8005(10). 
15 
fourth or uent DUI within lifetime 
IS a Iy a felony." Id. at 1. Mr. Schmoll 
en ncement, that the Montana U was was 
not a substantially conforming foreign criminal Montana 
could have charged as a felony if broufJht in Idaho." Id. 
In comparing Montana and Idaho statutes, the rt of Is noted that 
Montana a se DUI law; under Montana law if the a 
concentration O. or more, there is a rebuttable inference that the person was in fact 
under influence of alcohol when driving." Id. at 
The rt Is 
(citing M.C.A. § 6'1 
with Idaho 
'1(1 )(a) 
, "Idaho 
does not consider a BAC of 0.08 or more as merely rebuttable being under 
the influence either; it is a per se violation of the statute to drive with a BAC of 0.08 or 
more." Id. (citing I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a)). Regardless of this difference, the Court of 
Appeals found it significant that both statutes "prohibit the same essential conduct -
driving while under the influence of alcoho!." Id. It further noted, "Proving that a person 
is under the influence absent a BAC test requires a greater degree of impairment in 
Montana than in Idaho, since in Idaho, the ability to be impaired 'to the slightest degree,' 
while in Montana, the ability to drive 'safely' is the quality that must be diminished." !d. 
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted, "Montana's higher standard surpasses the 
elements required for a violation in Idaho. These two statutes frame their prohibitions 
using the same language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to 
sustain a violation." Id. 
With respect to the argument advanced by Schmoll before the district court-that 
the Montana statute did not substantially conform to the Idaho statute because his 
16 
conviction would not been a felony under Idal'lo law~tl'le Court of 
argurYlent was "misplaced" in light of Idal'lo I.C. §1 
"tl'lat comparison is section 1 and the fOrE3ign 
was violated ... [whicl'l] is entirely independent from the consideration 
whether violation in a misdemeanor charge or a charge.,,6 /d. at 
In this the district court relied on the fact that in Idaho a person can be 
found guilty of a DUI if his/her ability to a vehicle is impaired the slightest 
ree, and in \/Vyoming a can found guilty of a DUI if the ability 
is dimin (I~., pp. district court noted that 
§ 1 ~5·233(b )(iii)7 contains similar safety language that is in the Montana statute 
(from the Schmoll Opinion). (R., pp.66-68.) on tile safety language the district 
court concluded that Schmoll was controlling because it is easier to get a DUI in Idaho 
than it is in Wyoming and, therefore, all Wyoming DUI convictions would constitute a 
DUI in Idaho. (R., pp.66-68.) However, the district court did not employ any statutory 
analysis to Mr. Schall's argument that under the per se theory in Idaho a defendant 
cannot be prosecuted in his/her BAC is below O.OS. (R., p.6S.) 
The district court's reliance on Schmoll is misplaced because Mr. Schall's 
Wyoming conviction was pursuant to Wyoming per se DUI statutes and not the 
6 Mr. Schall recognizes that the facts of his Wyoming conviction are not relevant to the 
statutory comparison. However, it should be noted that approximately one hour and 
forty minutes after the stop, Mr. Schall participated in a scientific test which indicated 
that his BAC was 0.066 and 0.06S. (09/13/11 Tr., p.21, Ls.S-12; see also Affidavit of 
John H. Harris attached to the Amended Motion to Augment, p.2.) As such, Mr. Schall 
could not have been prosecuted for his Wyoming DUI if it had occurred in Idaho. 
7 Wyoming Statute § 31-5-322(b)(iii), contains Wyoming's impairment theory of DUI 
conviction and states that a person shall not operate a vehicle if he/she is under the 
influence of alcohol to a degree that renders him/her "incapable of safely driving .... " 
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irment (\lVyoming Information and ,Judgment attached Augmentation as 
Pia ibit Mr. Schall was not charged under Wyoming's impairment 
§ 3'1 (iii), comparisons of that statute with Idaho's impairment 
no guidance as question Mr. Schall's 
conviction is ntially similar. This distinction is critical because in Idaho there is a 
nificant differencf;) pursuing a DUI on the se theory versus the 
impairment I n Andrus, the Idaho rt of ,<\ppeals noted the 
two theories as follows: 
VVhile I.e. § '1 establishes only one of driving under the 
influence, it may proved in either of two and distinct It 
may as by the direct and mstantial of 
impairment of ability to drive due the influence alcohol. Alternatively, 
if chemical testing was performed in with the statute, the 
crime may be proved by forensic evidence that the defendant's alcohol 
concentration the statutory percentage. The statutory 
percentage is contained within the definition of the crime and is 
conclusive, not presumptive, of guilt; driving a vehicle while one has an 
alcohol concentration of .10% or more is deemed per se to be a violation 
of the law. Evidence relevant under the per se theory of proof is not 
necessarily relevant under the impairment theory. 
Andrus, 118 Idaho at 713. Andrus is instructive, as the impairment theory and the per 
se theory are two distinct and separate ways to pursue a DUI, both of which require 
separate forms of evidence. It follows that comparing the impairment portions of 
Idaho's DUI statute and Wyoming's DUI statute will not provide any guidance as to 
whether Mr. Schall's Wyoming conviction is substantially similar to Idaho's because 
Mr. Schall'S Wyoming conviction is based on a per se theory of DUI. Therefore, the 
district court erred when it relied on Schmoll because that holding primarily deals with 
the impairment theory as opposed to the per se theory. 
When the Court of Appeals' rationale in Schmoll is used in the context of 
comparing Idaho and Wyoming's per se DUI statutes, it leads to the conclusion that 
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is 
still 
com 
statute not substantially conform Idaho's, the 
, under 
can be under the influence if h 
ree and in Montana a defendant is 
Idaho at The Court of 
than Montana's a 
impairment impairment that a 
driving ability is impaired to the slightest 
influence if IS not drive, 
then concluded that Idaho' standard 
that is impaired the 
drive and, thus, all Montana DUI convictions 
might 
on the impairment 
would constitute convictions in Idaho, ler The opposite is true when one 
Idaho's per se DUI statute to \Nyom per se DUI statute, In Idaho, a 
with a under 0, cannot p driving under the influence, 
while in Wyoming that same of defendants can be prosecuted, It follows that 
Idaho a higher per se standard than \/Vyorning, while all Idaho's DUI convictions 
based on the per se theory would constitute a DUI in VVyoming, not all of \/Vyoming's 
DUI per se convictions constitute a DUI in Idaho, Based on the logic of Schmoll, the 
Wyoming per se DUI statute does not substantially conform to Idaho's, as Wyoming 
criminalizes the behavior of a class of defendants that Idaho has determined is not 
criminal as a matter of law, 
There is an additional difference between Idaho's per se DUI statute and 
Wyoming's, In addition to being unlawful to drive while under the influence of alcohol or 
with a blood alcohol concentration of 0,08, in Wyoming it is also unlawful to have a 
blood alcohol concentration of 0,08 or greater within two hours of driving, regardless of 
whether the person's blood alcohol concentration was below 0,08 at the time of driving, 
In contrast, Idaho's statute criminalizes the act of driving (or being in physical control) 
while under the influence of alcohol (whether actually under the influence or under the 
19 
o. or S. § :31 this 
that ue 
were "prohibit same 
under the alcohol .... " Schmo/l,144 Idaho at 
(emphasis The plain language of the VVyoming's prohibits different 
conduct than Idaho's statute, namely \!vyoming's statute criminalizes drivin~J 
a alcohol of or driving. 
In sum, under Idaho's se DUI a defendant with a under. 
as a matter of law, ~le/she is not under the influence. In 
Wyominr], same could p if his/her and 
D. such, all per se Idaho convictions will a conviction in \JVyoming, but not all 
Wyoming se DUI convictions will constitute a DUI in Idaho. In fact, the would 
not have been able to Mr. Schall's VVyoming DUI had it occurred in Idaho. 
such, and based on the logic of Schmoll, the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Schall's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Schall respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to dismiss and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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